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ORAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ON THURSDAY, 16TH JUNE,
2011 AT THE NHIF AUDITORIUM, NAIROBI
PRESENT
Ahmed Farah

Presiding Chair, Kenya

Ronald Slye
Gertrude Chawatama
Berhanu Dinka
Margaret Shava

Commissioner, USA
Commissioner, Zambia
Commissioner, Ethiopia
Commissioner, Kenya

(The Commission commenced at 12.00 Noon)
(Opening Prayers)
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Good afternoon. I welcome you to today’s
hearing. As it has been our tradition, let me introduce the panel.
(The Presiding Chair Commissioner Farah introduced himself
and other TJRC Commissioners)
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Our process is well known to all of you by
now but, just in case there are one or two people who have just come in, the witnesses
will be brought in and sworn and they will give their testimony. The Leader of Evidence
will lead the questioning in their testimony. On completion, the panel of Commissioners
will pose further questions to witnesses and that will be our procedure.
I request everybody in this hall to respect the witness as he or she gives their testimony,
even though we may not agree with them on what they say. I request all of you to switch
off your mobile phones. Do not put it on silence because once it rings, you will hear the
vibration and you will automatically be forced to answer it. You will then start walking
out and that upheaval will create distraction.
Are there any counsel present in the auditorium today? I can see none on both sides of the
aisles. If there are no counsel, then it means there are no preliminary issues to be raised.
In that case, Leader of Evidence, please, proceed, bring the witness, swear him and start
leading the evidence.
Just before you start swearing the witness in, I want to repeat that no flash photography is
allowed because it will distract us and no taking of photos while the witness is giving
evidence.
(Mr. Paul Murimi took the oath)
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Mr. Tom Chavangi: Thank you Commissioners. Before I start leading the witness, I
must say that this witness was neither invited nor summoned by this Commission.
However, as a result of having gotten his contacts from the CEO, he was called and he is
here on his own volition. He has appeared voluntarily and I think that is an
encouragement to this Commission such that he wants to share information that will help
this Commission.
Mr. Murimi, for the sake of record, kindly state your name again.
Mr. Paul Murimi: My name is Paul Murimi, a former intelligence officer and in this
particular case, I visited Wajir and Mandera.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Mr. Murimi, I will be leading you; then, you will be answering to
my questions. So, there are a few issues that we will need to clarify as you answer the
questions.
I have just shared a statement with you dated 16th February, 1984. Kindly confirm if that
statement or report dated 16th February, 1984 and signed by yourself is a true reflection
of your thoughts.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, it is.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Would you wish to admit that report to this Commission?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, I would.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Commissioners, I wish that the report Mr. Murimi did on the 16th
of February, 1984 be admitted as an exhibit.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): So admitted.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: What were you then in 1984?
Mr. Paul Murimi: In 1984, I was working in the National Intelligence Headquarters as
one of the officers there and I was directed by the then Director of Intelligence to
accompany the members of the Kenya Intelligence Committee to North Eastern for a
visit.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: For how long did you serve as an Intelligence Officer?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I served for thirty years.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Can you remember the name of the person who directed you to
accompany KIC to the northern region?
Mr. Paul Murimi: He was called Mr. Kanyotu.
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Mr. Tom Chavangi: Is Mr. Kanyotu alive today or is he deceased?
Mr. Paul Murimi: He is dead.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Do you know who organized the KIC meeting to the northern
region?
Mr. Paul Murimi: The meeting was organized by the Office of the President and the
idea behind it was to go and find out what really plagued that place. Several reports had
been received by the Kenya Intelligence Committee on the situation in that place which
was not pleasant and they wanted to go and see the situation on the ground.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Some of the witnesses who have appeared before this Commission
have actually mentioned three organs; the KIC, the KSC and the NAC. The KIC is the
Kenya Intelligence Committee, the KSC is the Kenya Security Committee and the NAC
is the National Security Committee. As an intelligence officer who has served for about
thirty years, can you give us the link between the KIC, KSC and NAC and how they
operate?
Mr. Paul Murimi: The Kenya Intelligence Committee is composed of representatives
from the army, the police, intelligence service and Permanent Secretaries Internal
Security and at that time, we had information. I cannot remember the whole list of them
but there were several Permanent Secretaries involved, including Home Affairs.
The Kenya Security Committee by then was chaired by the Vice-President and in his
absence, it was chaired by either the Minister for Internal Security or one of the members,
depending on the situation.
The National Security Committee includes the Director of Intelligence, the
Commissioner of Police, the CGS and they directly report to the President.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: What is the link between these three organs and how do they
function? Which one is more superior to the other in terms of reporting and hierarchy?
Mr. Paul Murimi: The KIC simply collects information as it is in the country and that
report is then presented to the Kenya Security Committee where ministers are involved.
The members who collect that intelligence report are the ones listed as members of the
KIC. They report to the Kenya Security Committee and then the Committee discusses
what could be the way out of the various problems noted at that particular time.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: In the report that you did on the 16th of February, there are certain
points that you noted in alphabetical order. We shall look through some points so that we
can get some clarity from you.
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If you look at page one on tribal animosity, the second last sentence where it says that
their conflicts, therefore, extends across the border and tribal clashes are a common
phenomenon--- Several solutions were tabulated by yourself, one of them being
continued security patrols and operations to diffuse tribal tensions. Was the first solution
discussed at the meeting that was held at Wajir?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I do not recollect in detail what was discussed in Wajir but all I
remember is that the District Security Committee had a chance to tell us what really
happened in their place. The major task of the team was just to find out what was
happening and they were relying on what they were told by the people on the ground.
This issue of patrols was very important as a way of pre-empting the clashes that arose
from time to time in those parts. It was not discussed that a, b c d should be done but one
way of maintaining security in the area was by having intensified patrols in the areas
where tribal tension and other issues of insecurity have been experienced.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: That takes me to my next question. Was this report that was
generated a report to your bosses?
Mr. Paul Murimi: This report was to my director because wherever he went out with a
team, he would wish to be appraised on what happened so that when he goes to the next
meeting, he will know exactly what happened and at what time.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: What you are telling us is that while the DC, who was the head of
the DSC at that time was talking, is when you developed this report or was this report
generated from minutes from the DSC meeting?
Mr. Paul Murimi: There was a secretary to the committee and if I recall, I think it was
Mr. Mwangovya, and he is the one who was taking the minutes. These were just my
personal notes to my Director to appraise him because he should have been the one in the
meeting but he could not make it. Therefore, I had to give him a comprehensive report of
what transpired so that when he goes to the meeting, he will know exactly what happened
and where it happened.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: I must confess that I did not share this with you, but there was the
initial list of members of the KIC who were supposed to visit the region during that time.
That list says that the visit was supposed to start on the Wednesday of 8th to Friday 10th
February, 1984. Commissioners, I am referring to a list from Office of the President
which was done by one of the officers who appeared before us.
Commissioner Chawatama: Leader of Evidence, through the Chair, we have two lists;
the list of 24th and the list of 29th. Which list are you referring to?
Mr. Tom Chavangi: I am referring to the list of 24th. On the second page, the name of
Mr. Murimi is appearing on the list of the 24 as number five: Mr. P M Murimi,
Directorate of Intelligence. On the list that is marked “Tour of North Eastern Province”,
Kenya Intelligence Committee which brings out the itinerary, his name does not appear
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but instead, it is a gentleman by the name of Mr. C K Gachuhi, Deputy
Secretary/Directorate of Intelligence.
Mr. Murimi, I did not share this list with you. From the subsequent list, your name
appears as number five, Mr. P M Murimi, Directorate of Intelligence and on the first list,
your name does not appear as one of the persons who were supposed to go to that region.
Did you then replace Mr. Gachuhi at that particular time?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, I replaced Mr. Gachuhi because I was his deputy.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Why didn’t Mr. Gachuhi go to this region as initially planned?
Mr. Paul Murimi: He told me that he had to sort out some business with the office
because at that particular time, we did not have a Deputy Director and whenever the
Director was not in, he used to stand for the Director. Therefore, he could not go for a
long journey because the Director could be called for various appointments and there
would be nobody to answer to things concerning the office. That was why I took the
journey on his behalf.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: What was the role of intelligence in this mission?
Mr. Paul Murimi: We were the people who collected intelligence in the crowd and
compiled it and presented it to the Government. In that particular case, we were doing the
same task.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Did the intelligence that you were collecting from the ground cut
across the board or was it just specific intelligence on specific issues? Was it overall
intelligence like development, security issues and so on?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Whereas we concentrated on matters of intelligence, we did not
divorce ourselves from other issues like development because whatever is done in the
country by any particular group of people has a bearing on security. We noted where the
function of the Government was being impaired and, therefore, we tried to get the genesis
of the matter and advise the Government accordingly and the Government took
appropriate action.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Was the genesis of the KIC mission to the northern region to deal
with development issues?
Mr. Paul Murimi: They were mostly development issues but we did not overlook the
issue of security because irrespective of whether we would have liked to talk about
development, definitely, security had a big impact on development of the area. You note
that in the same report, I have mentioned something about development and I have listed
problems experienced and why they were being experienced and why security forces
were to be involved and so forth.
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Mr. Tom Chavangi: I asked that because most of the witnesses who appeared before
you stated that this tour was mostly development but, at least, you have come up with a
different view to say that beside development, there was also the element of security. Did
you at any given time visit any development projects in that region? Were you shown any
development projects by the team on the ground?
Mr. Paul Murimi: If I recollect, the only development project I was able to visit was the
Mandera Irrigation Project along River Daua. We only had a night stop in Wajir and
Garissa. On matters of development, the big problem of the area at that time was security
and that security was affecting development in the area and that had to be addressed.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Are you confirming to this Commission that in your tour of the
northern region, the first development project that you came across was in Mandera?
Mr. Paul Murimi: That is the one I actually visited.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Were you with that team all the time?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I was with them but at one time or another; I was with my officers
trying to find out other cross-border issues.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: I am asking that because some witnesses stated here that some
development projects were visited in Wajir.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Maybe, that time, I was with my officers because what really
happened was that whenever they wanted to visit a project, I would be left with my
officers trying to find out what could be done to resolve certain problems, mostly those
affecting cross-border issues.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: In terms of intelligence, what was the intelligence on the ground
before you arrived in the northern region in relation to security because most of the
witnesses who were here before you said that it was an operation zone?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I wish to inform the Commission that by the time we were going
there, there were no incidences that had taken place. It was a normal visit to view the area
and issues that had been taking place in the area were well known by the members who
visited the place. At that particular time, there was no immediate issue that propelled us
to go there to resolve; we were going there to note what really goes on in that particular
area and appraise ourselves as members of KIC, instead of sitting in the office all the
time and receiving reports. The situation in the area was not very volatile in all the
districts; the problem that was a bit disturbing was tribal animosities that were noted in
the area of Wajir. That was where the problem was but on the day of our visit, we did not
have any problems; we were simply going to visit. What arose, thereafter, was after we
had departed.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: How were you received by the DSC in Wajir?
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Mr. Paul Murimi: Our host was the Provincial Commissioner where he received us at
Garrisa and took us to all those places where we visited members of the DSC and they
were the ones who were briefing us on what they were experiencing.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: So, your host was the PC?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: With my little knowledge on issues of protocol, I would think that
for such a high-powered delegation, the first stop could have been the headquarters in
Garissa, courtesy call to the PC and then from there, you could go to the districts. It
seems that the first stop for this high-powered delegation was Wajir.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Actually, we stopped in Garissa and from there, we went to Wajir.
We flew to Garissa, then Wajir, Mandera and then came back to Garissa. Garissa was the
stopping point.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Are you confirming to the Commission that the first stop was
Garissa, second stop was Wajir and then Mandera?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: When you went back to Garissa after Mandera, did you at any
given time get intelligence about the beginning of the rounding up of the Degodia men in
Wajir?
Mr. Paul Murimi: When we came back from Mandera and into Garissa, I did not
receive any information on any problem at Wajir at that particular time because we had
just had a night stop and then the following day, we flew out. We did not get any report at
that particular time that something had taken place in Wajir. We only heard it when we
came to Nairobi that there was a problem in Wajir and that the DSC Wajir, was handling
it. That was the initial report that we received but personally, I did not receive it at
Garissa.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: What you are saying is that you never received information about
the rounding up of the Degodia men in Garissa but you confirm that you came to know
about the massacre when you arrived in Nairobi?
We had some witnesses who said that they got to know about that incident while they
were in Garissa, when your team was being hosted by the Provincial Commissioner for
dinner before departure for Nairobi. Could you have been privy to this kind of
information? I am asking this because you were in charge of intelligence.
Mr. Paul Murimi: When we were being hosted in Garissa at the PC’s residence, I
remember I went out for quite a long period and when I came back, the reception had
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already more or less wound up and we simply went for a rest. At that particular time,
there was no talk of anything and it is probable that they had been briefed when I was out
of the reception but I remember that when I came back here, I received the full details of
whatever had happened in Wajir from our office.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: I will take you to your report, page three, point B, headlined
“Banditry”. Kindly, just read for us that paragraph, Mr. Murimi.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Armed gangsters operate in the entire North Eastern Province. These
are usually ex-shiftas who have turned to crime as a way of life, runaway insurgents,
tribesmen armed by the neighbouring countries for self defense or those who have
purchased arms for the same purpose, poachers and animal rustlers. Some of the acts of
banditry are committed by infiltrators passing through our territory for missions to
neighbouring countries.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Do you confirm that this is what you received from the DSC?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, that is what we received.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Do you confirm that one of the solutions was communal
punishment where tribal element is established?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Do you also confirm solution number three, which is detention of
known criminal collaborators?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Do you confirm solution number four of disarming the locals and
solution number five which is rehabilitation of defectors and surrenderees?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: At the time, what was your understanding of communal
punishment where tribal element is established?
Mr. Paul Murimi: This is mainly a pastoralist area and the problem that used to happen
there was mostly animal rustling from one group to the other. The communal punishment
applicable at that particular time was that if one community was known to have aggressed
the other by stealing their animals, then if we cannot trace them, then the community
would have to share this one. That was contained by the then laws that existed at that
particular time.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Was this communal punishment that you are talking about
contained in the laws? Was it provided for in the local laws or the statutory laws?
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Mr. Paul Murimi: In the statutory laws. I remember, there was the Public Order Act
which was operational at the time and they were contained somewhere there; so, it was
not outside the framework of the law at that particular time. In the context of this, we are
talking about where animal stealing is concerned, not human beings. That is why the
communal law applied in that part of the country. It was mostly applied where animal
rustling was rampant.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: My looking at these solutions one to five, apart from solution
number two where you say that it applies to animals, the rest seems to apply to human
beings. Why is it that number two is very specific to animals and the rest seems to be
applying to human beings, because you cannot detain an animal or known criminal
collaborators? You cannot disarm an animal or rehabilitate an animal. So, why is it that
number two is very specific to animals and the rest to human beings?
Mr. Paul Murimi: We are talking about communal punishment where clans, the
Degodia and the Ajuran, at that time were involved in animal rustling and there was to be
a solution to it. If the persons who stole were not established and the crime persisted, this
could be applied by getting the aggrieving clan some of the animals taken away to repay
the clan that has been affected.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: My understanding of that is that it is provided for in their culture
and not necessarily the law.
Mr. Paul Murimi: It applies to both.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Solution number three, detention of known criminal collaborators.
Did you at any given time get to know what the DSC meant by detention of known
criminal collaborators?
Mr. Paul Murimi: The DSC was saying that for these bandits to operate, they would
usually rely on their clansmen to help them do it. Such clansmen who were helping the
bandits to operate could be detained.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: I will still take you back to these solutions. If you look at solutions
number two, three and four, these are solutions that took place immediately after the visit
of 8th. Was it a coincidence that the DSC, where KIC was seated and having a meeting in
the DC’s office and the DC is talking about solution number two, three and four and
twenty four hours later, those solutions are practically applied by rounding up the
Degodia men, detaining them, presuming them to be criminal collaborators, disarming
them and actually torturing them? Was it a coincidence that your team was also there
when the events took place?
Mr. Paul Murimi: As I said from the outset, we were not aware whether the incident
will take place and it coincidentally took place after we had left. Note also that these
suggestions were not made on that particular day. They had been applicable before, so it
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was a continuation of what had been taking place before. I would agree with you that it
was just a coincidence and not premeditated by KIC.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: If we look at the development issues of North Eastern Province and
development setbacks, loyalty and morale, we do not seem to have solutions to these.
Was it also a coincidence that these development issues did not have solutions yet
banditry and tribal animosity had immediate solutions? Like in development setbacks,
you are giving suggestions of the way forward. For instance, in number two, you say that
huge sums of money would be required to develop North Eastern and Treasury can only
achieve this through long-term planning, but is that the solution to this development
setback?
Mr. Paul Murimi: It was noted by the committee that without development, the problem
of insecurity cannot be wholly resolved. So, development goes hand in hand in solving
the problem that existed that particular time.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: I am trying to establish that under A and B, the DSC was in a
position to give you categorically the solutions and they actually numbered them as 1, 2
and 3, but under the rest, the other forms of development, to me, they do not look more of
solutions but future suggests for alleviating some of the sufferings in the northern region.
But under banditry and tribal animosity, they are very specific that this is what should be
done and it seems as if, as you say, those are things that were happening and continued
happening even after your departure. There are specific solutions to specific issues, but
under development, we cannot see specific solutions to specific issues. So, why do we
have such a report whereby they point specifically and giving solutions to a specific issue
and yet, towards the end of the report, it is as if it is watered down?
Mr. Paul Murimi: You cannot wholly say that we overlooked this issue of development.
Maybe, what came out may feature by going through the report. Development does not
take place in a day. It is a long-term process and we, as members of the KIC, appreciate
the fact that without development, the problem cannot be resolved. You also note that I
have gone further, with all other issues, and given what the meeting felt about all those
issues. So, it is not a question of omitting or concentrating only on security, but rather
looking at the overall situation and that is what the KIC had gone to witness. About the
elaboration on development, we had people like the Provincial Development Officers
who could really go deeper into those issues, but this was a summary of what was
happening in those areas.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: That takes me to my next question. There was immediate action on
this issue of the disarmament of the Degodias. That was an immediate action after your
visit on 8th. A few hours later, action was taken. The Commission was in the northern
region one month ago. Twenty seven years ago, there is a report from you to your bosses
talking about development and showing what should be done to ensure that the region
develops, but our visit to this region one month ago, the same issues that were there 27
years ago are the same issues that are persisting. Why take 27 years or even more in
future for development to come yet there was an immediate action of rounding up the
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Degodias on this particular day after your visit? There was an immediate action on
something that was reported to you that pertains to security but no action has been taken
on development 27 years later. It is the same road, the same borehole that your team
allegedly saw. Why that difference?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I may not be able to answer that question because there are relevant
departments which can handle the area of development. If nothing has taken place, I
cannot be able to vouch for that because I was not in a position to implement any of those
things. The directorate was not the implementer of all these things.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: But you agree or feel what the Commission feels that there was
immediate action on a certain issue and no action on other issues. You can see the
mischief in that?
Mr. Paul Murimi: You can take it the way you want, but as I have told you, as a
directorate, we do not do development issues. I would also like to tell the Commission
that after this particular incident, I went to North Eastern as one of the intelligence
officers and served there for three years between 1992 and 1995 and this issue of
development was coming up every time. We always used to discuss what we could do.
Some things were done or were being done, but whether they were successful, I cannot
vouch for that. When I was there in 1992-1995, we had people starting farming in places
like Bute and Eastern Garissa and along the River Tana. Those were areas of
development. We had people using pangas and jembes to clear those areas. These were
some of the things that we were trying to do to promote those people at that particular
time. If nothing substantial has taken place; it is not because the Government was
reluctant. It is the nature of the place or the way things have continued to operate in that
part of the country.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: You said earlier on that you had the intelligence person in Wajir.
You had your officers in Wajir in charge of intelligence. Before you got to Nairobi, the
DSC had made a decision to round up the Degodia men in Wajir. By not informing you
of this impeding or actual rounding up of the men and the end result of the Wagalla
Massacre, do you think it was a failure by your officers?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Whereas I was not informed at that particular time, the officers have
got communication with my head office and they could have communicated that
information. I did not check at that particular time. So, even if they never told me on that
particular time, they had already informed my head office about what was happening.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: So, there was no reporting requirement in terms of hierarchy? So, a
junior officer, who probably is in charge of some issues, for instance, in charge of some
aspects of security in Wajir, does not report to you but can circumvent you and report to
your bosses. So, what you are saying is that there was a breakdown?
Mr. Paul Murimi: No, that is not what I am saying. We are talking about this particular
incident about Wagalla. I hope it is the one you are referring to.
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Mr. Tom Chavangi: I am referring to that.
Mr. Paul Murimi: We were at Garissa and I told you that for some time, I broke from
the meeting and went out. You have told me that some members of my team were
informed about the issue that particular time and I told you that I came later on but I did
not receive any information and went to rest when we were preparing to come the
following day. That does not mean that the fact that the report did not come to me at that
particular time had great impact or down-looking on my person. The head office or our
officers have a right to communicate with the head office whenever something happens,
irrespective of their rank.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Thank you, Mr. Murimi. That was my last question.
Commissioners, I hand over the witness to you.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Thank you. The Commissioners will ask
you questions and I will start with Commissioner Slye.
Commissioner Slye: Thank you, Presiding Chair, and Leader of Evidence. I want to
thank you, Mr. Murimi, for appearing before us today. As the Leader of Evidence had
pointed out in the beginning, the fact that you found time to come here and share with us
your testimony, we very much appreciate that. The testimony of you and your colleagues
is extremely helpful to us as we try to understand the structures of the Government,
intelligence, military and security personnel of Kenya and that is where I would like to
start. I am also someone who is relatively new to Kenya. I am still trying to understand
clearly in my mind what these different bodies are and what their functions are. The
Leader of Evidence had asked you about the KIC and the KSC, and if I understand this
correctly, the Kenya Intelligence Committee would collect information and they would
then pass that information on to the Kenya Security Committee (KSC), and then the KSC
would decide whether any action should be taken. Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: So, that is sort of going down the chain. I am sort of interested, or I
want to understand the relationship between the KIC and the various provincial security
committees. Is it through the PSCs that the KIC would mostly get its information?
Mr. Paul Murimi: There are two security committees dealing with security matters in
the country. At the district level, we have the DIC that collects the information and then
there is the DSC that after getting that information decides what action to take on any
issue. That is at the district level. At the provincial level, there is the similar body the PIC
and the PSC at the provincial level. Issues to do with provincial matters are taken at that
level. When you come to the national level, there is the intelligence committee and the
security committee. That is how they go. The intelligence committee collects the
information and the security committee decides what action can be taken.
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Commissioner Slye: So, the intelligence committees; the DIC, PIC and the KIC, will be
the ones that would have the most information in terms of intelligence and then the DSC,
PSC and the KSC would be the ones that would be more likely to operationalize things
based upon that intelligence. Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: In some other minutes of the PSC, we have seen that the PSC might
have an issue that they need guidance on and they would indicate in the minutes that they
would look to the KIC in terms of action.
So, does that mean that in some cases, the KIC could guide the PSC on what to do?
Explain that relationship.
Mr. Paul Murimi: It would depend on the issue at hand. But when you come to
operational matters, the people who can operationalize things or who can tell how the
situation is and how grave it is are the people on the ground. They may ask for help from
higher echelons if they cannot deal with it but if they can deal with it, they can deal with
it there and then and then inform the other higher offices what they have done.
Commissioner Slye: So would the PSC in some cases if they felt it wanted to get advice
from the KIC and different things that they might have been thinking about in terms of
action or further intelligence if they needed--Mr. Paul Murimi: They may.
Commissioner Slye: To move to my next question of your actual trip which you
accompanied the KIC. Let me first make sure that I understand the trip and the
documents that you created. On the trip, you, first of all, say that the KIC met with the
DSC members on matters concerning security, personnel and administrative problems.
That suggests to me that that was the main focus of the trip. In fact, at the end on the last
page of the report, you say that the KIC members were impressed by the visit as it
enabled them to understand the issues affecting the province. I gather that the issues
affecting the province were predominantly issues around security, personnel and
administration. Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: But your report is talking about tribal animosity, banditry, divided
loyalty, Islamic fanaticism, Government loyalty and morale. All of that really fits under
the security, personnel and administrative issues. Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: Is it right to say that the major focus of the trip was security and
within security, you said that security is very bad and it includes variety of things
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including morale of personnel in the area including development and a variety of things?
Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: If somebody said that the main purpose of the trip was development
and not security, would that be a correct statement of the purpose of the trip?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I do not know what others said. I just understood that they were
talking about development. We did talk about development as it is actually listed there,
but the fact of it was that whatever issues happened in the province were largely being
hampered by security.
Commissioner Slye: The main purpose was security. Then, you also said that at one
point, in response to questions by the Leader of Evidence, that you might not have gone
to some of the site visits by members of the delegation. So, when you went to Garissa,
Wajir, Mandera and then back to Garissa, did the delegation move together or you split
and have separate meetings when you were at different places or how did that work?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I said that, personally, whenever there were no areas concerning my
area of operation, I would take time with my officers. This is exactly happens in some of
those areas that if there was no issue concerning the plenary meeting, I would retreat with
my officers to discuss things concerning our intelligence gathering methods and
problems, so that I could come back and also advise, which is not listed here, on the
problems they were experiencing and the report they made. That is exactly what I did at
that particular time.
Commissioner Slye: So, you could sometimes have separate meetings with intelligence
officers in those different locations and so, you might not have been where the other
members of the delegation went?
Mr. Paul Murimi: At the development projects.
Commissioner Slye: Do you know whether other members of the delegation had
separate meetings with people in their areas?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I recollect that different officers who went there could arrange with
their officers what to discuss and where to meet. But I cannot point that so and so met his
officers here, and so and so met his there.
Commissioner Slye: Coming back to the document you produced, again on the first
page, the first paragraph, the last sentence reads: “Enumerated below is a summary of
their observations---“I read that paragraph to mean the KIC. So, if my understanding is
correct, then this document is the views of the KIC based upon their visit.
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Mr. Paul Murimi: This is what was observed but when we were going there, we were
not going to resolve anything. We were going for a study trip. We were not going to give
any orders or directives. I called it a study trip by the KIC and whatever happened
thereafter was just coincidental. So, whereas these things were mentioned by whoever
was giving us the briefings, mostly the DSCs were giving us the briefings from their
experiences, we could not close our eyes, but at the same time, the only encouragement
that we could give them is to keep on trying to resolve the problem. And even these
resolutions that we have there were not applicable only at that particular trip. They had
been ongoing, but it was reinforcing them as we were solving the problem that had been
recurring in these areas.
Commissioner Slye: Let me express my initial view of what this represents and you tell
me whether it is correct. The way I read this is that you wrote the document to reflect the
observations of the KIC during that trip and came out with the meanings that they heard
from the various DSCs. So, we look at tribal animosities and the solutions, for example. I
read that to suggest that in meetings where the DSC, the DSC and the KIC discussed
tribal animosity and these various solutions. Will that be a correct understanding of the
document?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: So, in drafting the documents, did you have conversations with the
members of the KIC to confirm or understand what their observations were in order for
you to create this document?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Basically, whenever we had a plenary, the issues would arise, the
members of the DSC would tell us what their problems were and what they were doing.
Then the only observation that I can remember is that where they did well, we told them
to continue and where they could not resolve the problem immediately, we asked them to
look at some of those solutions and how they can apply them.
Commissioner Slye: Is this solely on your memory or did you discuss with other
members of the delegation the issues that you laid out here just to confirm that, that was
also their understanding? Did you refer the minutes from those meetings to help you to
refresh your memory to produce this document?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I being in the meeting, I was also taking some notes regarding the
area that affects our department. So, regarding composing these notes, I was taking them
as the meeting was going on and the talks were going on. So I have listed them from my
notes that I took at that time.
Commissioner Slye: Did you have access to other notes or the minutes of those meetings
before or after this in order to help you to report to your superiors about the nature of the
trip?
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Mr. Paul Murimi: I do not recollect because after this trip and after I had produced my
report, other meetings that took place by the KIC members were attended by my
superiors. So, whether they discussed those issues, I cannot tell off-head. I am repeating
that I drafted this report from my notes that I took during the proceeding. I gave these
notes to my superiors and the subsequent meetings that took place, I did not attend. It is
my superiors who attended and whether they discussed them or not, I cannot tell.
Commissioner Slye: So, after this trip, you did not attend any other meetings of the
KIC?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I did not attend. They were attended by my other superiors.
Commissioner Slye: Just one question on the report. The report is a summary based
upon your recollection about what was discussed between the KIC and the various DSCs.
Can you tell us a little bit more what those meetings were like? We have heard some
information that the DC, Wajir, for example, prepared a brief and he would have
presented the brief. Then I assume there was a discussion about it or how did the meeting
run? In addition to the brief presented by the DC, what else happened?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I recollect that when we arrived at Wajir, we were met by the DSC
team. Then we went to the place of reception. Then we had time for them to tell us how
the situation was in the place. As I said, we were on a study tour as members of the KIC.
What they said in that meeting is what I tried to shortlist.
Commissioner Slye: So, one functionI understand of the KIC was to gather intelligence.
So, I assume that one thing that happened in these meetings is that the different DSCs
presented their issues, either possible or maybe decided solutions and the purpose of
presenting that to the KIC was because the KIC was at the national level, the main body
to collect that information. So, they would turn that information over to the KIC. Is that
correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: So, part of the purpose was for the KIC to understand what issues
were affecting the different districts and what the districts were planning to do with those
issues. As part of that conversation, did the KIC members express their own views or say,
“hi, that is a very good idea, but that is not such a good idea” or “hi, we have come across
a problem like this in another part of the country and here is another technique that has
been used”. Would that be sort of the conversation as well or it is just listening from the
DSC to the KIC with the KIC not participating?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I recollect that when the DSCs presented their issues, they would be
asked what help they would like to have from the Government. That was the major issue
for the KIC, namely, what help can be given to those areas in view of these problems.
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Commissioner Slye: So, the KIC would ask that and the DSC would say, “we would like
“A”, “B” and “C”?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: When I have been in meetings like this or a delegation going
somewhere else, I am both receiving information from places on the ground, but I am
also giving advice based on my experiences and the experience of my colleagues and I
am trying to understand whether that was the nature of these meetings. So, the DSC
would lay out their issues and the solutions and the KIC would ask what help you need
from the Government and then I assume there would be a conversation where maybe the
DSC would say, “we need ‘X’ and the KIC might say, “well that is not realistic, but we
could maybe do ‘Y’ ”. So, there would be a give and take. Is that right?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: So that by the end of the meeting, there would be a general
consensus between the two bodies about what the issues were and what the solutions
were and why additional resources might be needed in order to address the solutions. Is
that right?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Slye: My last question, which I think you may not be able to answer
based on what you have said before that you did not attend the KIC meetings later--- But
we have received some evidence to suggest that shortly, I think in April, two months after
the Wagalla operation, a directive was given from the KIC to the PIC to say that in
future, all security operations should get prior approval of the Ministry before they are
undertaken. Do you have any knowledge about such a directive or new policy?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I am not aware.
Commissioner Slye: My very last question. To whom is this document circulated? It is
addressed to the Director of Intelligence but who else would have had access to it or
would have seen it?
Mr. Paul Murimi: We have different people in our department who had access to it who
were dealing with issues concerning the various places. Like the officers who were
dealing with the North Eastern desk, they had access to these notes.
Commissioner Slye: And that would be within the intelligence intervention?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, just within its ranges.
Commissioner Slye: Would something like this be shared with other members of the
KIC?
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Mr. Paul Murimi: It could have been shared because when I gave this document to my
director, he was at liberty to use it wherever he wanted.
Commissioner Slye: Thank you very much.
Commissioner Shava: Thank you, Mr. Murimi. I also have a few questions and please
bear with me if they sound a bit like something you have been through before. We are
really trying to understand the environment in which you were working. First, you said
that you were in North Eastern Province between 1992 and 1995. In what position and
where were you serving?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I was the Provincial Intelligence Officer stationed at Garissa and I
used to organize intelligence matters in the province at that time.
Commissioner Shava: Would you have been called the Provincial Special Branch
Officer or what? Had the title changed?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Provincial Intelligence Security Officer.
Commissioner Shava: Okay. We have to learn all these terms. What would your
relationship have been with the people at the district level in terms of gathering and
analyzing intelligence? I imagine that they were then District Security Intelligence
Officers. So, did you have regular meetings? How did you exchange information?
Mr. Paul Murimi: We have two instances, namely, when I was at the headquarters and
the province.
Commissioner Shava: When you were at the province. Actually both would be helpful.
Mr. Paul Murimi: At the provincial level, I had to receive reports from my officers
every morning and every time an issue arose. The communication was open. I had the
role of visiting them as and when necessary in their respective districts and discuss
issues. They also had to come to the headquarters to report on various developments in as
far as security is concerned. That was the relationship at the provincial level.
At the headquarters level, every provincial head had to report every morning or any other
opportune time what was happening in his province, especially the issues of importance.
If need be, if the issue was very intricate, he may call the headquarters to come and
enlighten us more. The reports would be in written form and not only verbally and all
these written reports had to come to the headquarters. It is at the headquarters that reports
from both the PC and the DC are collated. After collating those reports, the issues and the
matters of national interest were then referred to the KIC. That is how we operated.
Commissioner Shava: So, if for instance we take the instance of Wagalla, the Provincial
Officer, that time the Provincial Special Branch Officer or the Provincial Security
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Intelligence Officer, would have had to be reporting to the headquarters at all times.
What was going on? Not only do a report every day, but you have also said that when
there was an incident or a situation developing they would report as necessary, maybe
even more than once a day.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Shava: In investigating thereafter what happened at Wagalla, we have
heard testimony that officers came from headquarters to investigate. They would have
involved their person on the ground or would they not?
Mr. Paul Murimi: They would involve them.
Commissioner Shava: I know that you were intelligence officer and not a CID, but do
you have any knowledge of the procedure that the CID would follow? Would the
procedure be the same as yours or different?
Mr. Paul Murimi: It is not very much different.
Commissioner Shava: It would be unusual to you if a team came from the headquarters
to investigate and excluded their person on the ground from the fact finding?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I really do not know whether the CID does that because that is a
different department all together, but on our part, we would involve our officers because
they are the origin of the information.
Commissioner Shava: You said earlier in your testimony that you made this report to
your director to apprise him of the issues that had arisen on the tour before he attended
the meeting. To what meeting do you refer?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Our Director used to attend the KSC meetings, KIC meetings and
used to brief the President every day.
Commissioner Shava: Thank you. That is quite clear now. If we can just look again at
your report, and issues to which the Leader of Evidence referred to, after this section of
the report that you wrote, it concludes with either solutions or suggestions. Some places,
it is solutions and other places, it is just suggestions. Am I right to understand that where
it says solutions, those are things that have been or are being applied and it is an
agreement? You have said that when you went to Wajir, there was no immediate
emergency that caught your eye but there was a situation of tension which needed to be
addressed continually. So when you say solutions, am I right in understanding that, that
was what the DSC presented and the KIC agreed with it?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I said that the suggestions or solutions given here do not just emanate
from this particular meeting. They have been ongoing. So really there was nothing new
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that the KIC went to direct the DSC to do because they have been always applicable in
the past.
Commissioner Shava: So, that is an ongoing solution. The KIC has gone and said, “this
is the information within the knowledge of the KIC and these are the solutions being
applied”?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Shava: Thank you. We have heard about on the spot fact-finding mission
on 15th February that went to Wajir. Did you, yourselves, travel on that mission with the
DSC?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I was with the KIC team at that particular time. I was representing the
Director of Intelligence and my deputy who was not able to go on the safari.
Commissioner Shava: I am talking about after the incident at the airfield on 15th of
February, when now people had been removed from the airfield. There was on the spot
fact-finding mission which included the Chief of General Staff--Mr. Paul Murimi: I did not go myself.
Commissioner Shava: You were not on that one?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, I did not travel.
Commissioner Shava: With regard to the KIC, this is my final question; I am just trying
to understand the relationship. You have told us that the intelligence committees from the
district level to the provincial and to the national level and their counterparts which are
the security committees, which are more in terms of operationalizing decisions collect
intelligence and collate it. I presume that they also advise, because we have heard that
KIC was an advisory body. So they would advise in terms of what problems have been
identified and what kind of solutions might be applied. But the security committees are
the ones, we are told, that decide on how this intelligence is to be applied. We have also
heard that at the provincial level, the Provincial Intelligence Committee would meet
immediately prior to a PSC meeting and that they did not keep minutes but they just
extracted. They took an extract to the PSC meeting and the membership was more or less
the same people wearing different hats. Was that replicated even at the national level?
Mr. Paul Murimi: At the national level, we have said, we involve even Ministers.
Commissioner Shava: Yes, at the national security committee?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, at the national security.
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Commissioner Shava: So then my understanding would be that if you do not have
minutes - we have heard that they were destroyed at the national level. We do not even
know where those minutes of the intelligence committee are but there is a security
committee that meets and decides. So, to me, it sounds as if actually the intelligence
committees inform the agenda of the security committee because they take, not the whole
agenda necessarily, but definitely, at least, a part of the agenda because they meet,
identify issues right from intelligence which they think are important, they probably
identify solutions that they would advise, and then they take that bit to the security
committee. Am I correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: You are correct but the security committee does more than what may
be in the intelligence reports.
Commissioner Shava: Yes, because the security committee would also do more
developmental issues and staff morale and so on. But in terms of security, the intelligence
committee can actually inform the agenda of the security committee and even the
decisions because they will propose solutions, they will advise. So, therefore, it is as if
the intelligence committee, through the security committee, can decide on solutions?
Mr. Paul Murimi: As an intelligence officer, you are entitled to give some suggestions.
That is actually the work of the intelligence organization; to give some suggestions or
advise or whatever it is but the implementing body will be either the security bodies or
any other relevant bodies or Ministry.
Commissioner Shava: And at the national level, when I look at the composition of the
Kenya Security Committee, the national level one, you said it is chaired, and we have
heard from previous witnesses, by the Vice President, and in his absence, maybe the
Minister for Home Affairs. But those are not people who are involved in day to day
issues. So they will not know. So, I presume that decisions would be made based on the
advice given by intelligence. That will play a big part on how decisions are arrived at.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, I remember during our time most of the advice given by the
intelligence would be taken.
Commissioner Shava: It would be taken! Thank you very much, Mr. Murimi, I have no
further questions.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Yes, Commissioner Dinka!
Commissioner Dinka: Thank you very much, Mr. Murimi, for coming here again on
voluntary basis to help the Commission gain some more insights into the situation in the
North Eastern in the 1980s. You are very good to us because you said you served as the
chief of intelligence of the province in Garissa and then at the headquarters also and then
you were removed in the whole matter. After you returned on 10th to Nairobi from the
visit of February 9th, 1984, already the operation in Wajir was underway. According to
you, the District Intelligence Officers sends his report from the ground every morning to
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the Provincial Security Officer, and the provincial guy sends every morning to
headquarters the full report and sometimes when a new development happens, he sends
more than once every day. After you returned on 10th February, did you receive regular
reports on the situation that was developing in Wajir?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I did not receive regular reports on Wajir after I returned because my
area of concentration was not actually operational. It was the question of dealing with
other issues rather than operational issues. So the officer who was in the operational
issues is the one who was receiving what was going on.
Commissioner Dinka: If I assume the Directorate had received intelligence beginning
from the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and whatever, every day from Wajir through Garissa, would I
be right?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes!
Commissioner Dinka: I would be right! In that case, this being very important
development in Wajir, a big security operation, would that reach the desk of the Director
or manager?
Mr. Paul Murimi: It would!
Commissioner Dinka: And you mentioned that the Director is also a member of the KIC
and also advises the President or briefs him every day?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Dinka: Again, given the nature of what was happening in Wajir, the
Wagalla issue particularly, would I be right if I assume that the Director must have taken
it to the KIC and to the President?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I assume so!
Commissioner Dinka: I would be right?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes!
Commissioner Dinka: Very good. To go back again to this first paragraph, that will be
my last question, enumerated blog is a summary of their observations. When you say
their observations, it means the combination of PSC and KIC delegation. So that it
reflects what kind of common observations that developed in that meeting?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Dinka: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
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Commissioner Chawatama: I join the other Commissioners in thanking you for coming
to this Commission and testifying on a voluntary basis. For me, as a non Kenyan, what is
important about the step that you have taken is that we are seeing Kenyans taking
ownership of this process. Indeed, this is a people’s process. I hope a lot of people will
also take time for those who have the information to share with us, that they will
volunteer and come and share this information so that we can come up with a complete
and accurate record. What I would like to hear from you is maybe to walk us through
from Nairobi to Wajir. So you were told by your superiors: “Go and represent me in this
tour and be a part of this delegation.” Did you have a brief from the people on the ground
or from any department in the institution where you worked just to let you know what to
expect?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, I had.
Commissioner Chawatama: And what was in that brief?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Now, my officers on the ground, as I said, communicated with the
head office. The purpose of the visit was a study tour by the KIC on the problems
affecting this place. So when I went there, I said I would take time off with my officers--Commissioner Chawatama: No! You need to help me, I was not there. I am taking you
by your hand and you now receive instructions from your bosses here in Nairobi that you
are going to North Eastern Province on this tour. So I am saying in preparing yourself,
while still in Nairobi, did you get a brief on the province that you were going to tour?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, I had a brief and that brief is reflected in my notes: “go and
study about the issues concerning security apart from other things”.
Commissioner Chawatama: That was your brief?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Chawatama: Fine. Do you recall whether or not you all received a brief
as a delegation, that is, everybody who was now leaving Nairobi to go to North Eastern
Province? Did you all receive a further brief as a group?
Mr. Paul Murimi: When we left Nairobi, at the place where we took our plane,
Eastleigh, of course, the head of the delegation told us that we were going to North
Eastern because of ‘a’, ‘b’ , ‘c’, ‘d’. We were going to study the problems facing that
area and we were going as a team because we had always been receiving reports in the
office but, really, we did not know what was happening on the ground. So our purpose
for the journey is to see what is happening on the ground instead of just sitting in the
office and receiving briefs.
Commissioner Chawatama: Okay! You said you went to Garissa first and then you
went to Wajir. So you now land in Wajir; was this your first time to go to Wajir?
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Mr. Paul Murimi: It was my first time, yes!
Commissioner Chawatama: Okay! Would you like to share with us your first
impression of Wajir?
Mr. Paul Murimi: We arrived in Wajir; I cannot precisely say the time. We were
received by the DSC there and they took us to the army camp where we had some drinks.
I recollect that after that, the DSC had time to apprise us on what was going on there. At
that particular time, they told us the problems they were experiencing and they are listed
there.
Commissioner Chawatama: So it was at the army camp where the briefing took place?
The briefing did not take place at the DC’s Office or was that the second briefing?
Mr. Paul Murimi: That was the first briefing. The following day before we left for
Mandera, we had a meeting at the DC’s Office.
Commissioner Chawatama: So, now you are driving from the camp?
Mr. Paul Murimi: No, we spent the night at Wajir. When we were leaving the following
morning--Commissioner Chawatama: You had an opportunity to see Wajir Town?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Chawatama: What were your impressions?
Mr. Paul Murimi: That time, it was a small town with just many temporary shelters,
manyattas, in some places. The only land mark of importance was the airfield and the
DC’s office where there were some constructions. I do not recollect going to other places.
Commissioner Chawatana: What about on the streets, were there army or police
officers? Did you have any of these officers?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I spent much of the time in my office with my officers.
Commissioner Chawatama: You said that you had opportunity to talk to your officers
on the ground. What were some of the things that they discussed with you?
Mr. Paul Murimi: We discussed many issues ranging from their administrative
problems to the security issues they were experiencing and more so in the area of
intelligence collection hiccups, the areas of problems and why they were there. So, we
discussed their financial, operational problems and also their personnel problems in terms
of things like accommodation and so on. So we discussed a range of things.
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Commissioner Chawatama: Did they tell you that between November 1983 to about
February 6th, there were, in fact, about 14 incidences that took place; clashes between the
clans? Was this part of your brief?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, it was part of the brief. I cannot remember precisely what
number they gave but that was part of the brief they gave me.
Commissioner Chawatama: And at that point, you did not think that there was a very
serious security issue to be addressed?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I as a person?
Commissioner Chawatama: Yes, you as a person!
Mr. Paul Murimi: At that particular time, they told me the incidences which had taken
place and how they were trying to resolve them, and from my experiences in resolving
problems, we thought we could solve them as a department.
Commissioner Chawatama: And I take it you were able to give them some counsel on
how they could handle such situations?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
Commissioner Chawatama: Did you also encourage them that communication was very
important on things that they saw and heard?
Mr. Paul Murimi: This is part of their duties, yes.
Commissioner Chawatama: When you joined the rest of the team after you were
through talking to your officers, did you share some of the information with the rest of
the delegation that you had travelled with on some of the concerns that your officers were
bringing up?
Mr. Paul Murimi: If I recollect, informally!
Commissioner Chawatama: Informally! Did you share with them, for example, that
your officers had told you of the number of clashes that had taken place between
November and February or maybe even longer, but just that there were clashes and up to
about 6th because you were there now on 8th? But up to around 6th, there were some
disturbances that had taken place? Was that information shared with the rest of the
delegation?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Let me put it this way; the intelligence reports that were coming from
Wajir, all those people who were there were recipients of those written reports. So, they
were as much informed about the reports as I was briefed.
NHIF Auditorium, Nairobi

25

Thursday 16th June, 2011

Commissioner Chawatama: But they were not party to the briefs that you were having
with your officers?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Actually, even those briefs that I was having with my officers were
some of the things that they had also received through either our office or through the
other offices.
Commissioner Chawatama: Okay! When you look at page two of your report under
solution number 2, the one that deals with communal punishment with tribal elements is
established, I know that you have explained that this is as a result of the provision from
an Act. But on the face of what is in your report, how does one know that this applies to a
situation where cattle rustling is concerned and not human beings?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Firstly, about communal punishment, it is not just taken arbitrarily. It
is taken as a last resort, if it is to be taken. How would the intelligence department or
security committee know about it? They would know it from the ground by going to the
ground and getting the information from the ground. The operations as we found them
about those communities was that every community was privy to the security activities
such that if a crime was committed by a particular community, members of that
community will not reveal it; that a man did it or a group did it.
Commissioner Chawatama: As it relates to livestock?
Mr. Paul Murimi: We are talking about livestock.
Commissioner Chawatama: I think what puzzles me is also the use of the word “tribal
element”. What did you mean?
Mr. Paul Murimi: What we meant is that if one clan---, we are talking about clans,
sorry. The correct word here is clan, and not tribal because the Ajuran and Degodia there
they call themselves tribes but I think the real name should be clans.
Commissioner Chawatama: This is particularly important, maybe my Kenyan
colleagues understand but, definitely, I do not because what we have heard from earlier
witnesses is the collective punishment that was obtaining in North Eastern Province. This
is how Wagalla resulted in the rounding up of Degodia men and taking them to the
airstrip. There was a round up in Garissa as well where people were taken to the primary
school grounds. We are also trying to think where the DSC would draw those powers
from. What is it that gave them the power to act that way, to collectively bring people and
collectively punish them? So this has nothing to do with collective punishment of
persons. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I said that mostly communal punishment dealt with where one clan
aggrieved the other in terms of animal rustling, then the proper option would be, because
they cannot get the person who did it, if they got livestock from that clan, then the clan
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perhaps would learn a lesson. Even if they hid the perpetrators, they would not get away
with it. That way, I recollect that although that form of punishment was widely applied, I
do not recall using it during my time. They will be a bit cautious to repeat the same next
time because they know that if they do it, their animals will be rounded up, affecting even
the most innocent.
Commissioner Chawatama: What were your impressions of how the Kenya police and
the Administration Police were operating in Wajir? What were your impressions?
Mr. Paul Murimi: During my first visit there, I was informed that in most cases, they
were holding joint operations. The police would give their men and the DC would give
his men and they go for patrols or operations jointly. That is how they were doing it.
However, there was that problem that if you were a member of whatever clan and you are
in the operation and somebody got the information, some of them would not wish to
divulge what their clansmen had done even if they were in the operation.
Commissioner Chawatama: The reason why I have asked you this question, because
you are an intelligence person, one gets the impression that the police did not really know
their role, the Army did not know their role and as for the judiciary, I do not know
whether there were any courts at that time so that the roles of the different institutions or
departments were so blurred that nobody knew who was to do what. Did you get that
impression or were you satisfied that everybody knew what their role was?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Well, from my knowledge, I thought the APs and the regular police
used to hold joint operations generally. The army could only come as a back-up in case of
a serious issue. But how they operated in this particular incident, whether one group
overplayed the issue, I really cannot tell because this took place when we were not in
Wajir. It took place when we were out of the place.
Commissioner Chawatama: Do you recall when you came back to Nairobi – I do not
know when you handed in your report – but were you called again by your bosses after
the Wagalla Massacre to just, may be, try and shed more light as a person on the ground
on what could have triggered off such an incident?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I remember reading the briefs that came. I went back to the office and
went through the briefs.
Commissioner Chawatama: But you, as a person on the ground, were not called to shed
some light on maybe something that you saw or something that you heard that could have
triggered--Mr. Paul Murimi: The incident took place after we left Wajir. So what I was reading is
what happened after I left.
Commissioner Chawatama: You did not get my question or maybe I am
misunderstanding you. I said after you got back to Nairobi, did the Director of
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Intelligence, for example, call you to just maybe try to get more information from you to
help them understand what could have taken place? Or you just handed in your report and
that was it? You were not called?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I am sorry, I was not called. That may not have been an oversight
because they were in charge with the head of our office in Garissa. We were always in
touch with our provincial boss. He was abreast about all the issues.
Commissioner Chawatama: But you also would have been an independent mind? Is it
not?
Mr. Paul Murimi: If he called me, then I will
Commissioner Chawatama: Thank you so much.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Thank you, Mr. Murimi. I would just ask
you a few questions. Please, bear with us. You have been very co-operative so far. If I
may start with my first question, during your service, you belonged to the Special Branch
and not the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS)? Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): At that time, the Special Branch was part
of the police. Correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes!
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Therefore, you had a rank like any other
police officer?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Here in your report, I see that the man
whom you replaced when you were going to Gatuiya, you refer to him as a Deputy
Secretary. A Deputy Secretary is a rank of a civil servant. What was his police rank?
Mr. Paul Murimi: He did not have a police rank. He was seconded to us by the Office of
the President.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): So you had some civilians seconded to
you? Did you train them?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes, they were trained.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Now, do you agree with me that at the time
of the Garissa/Bulla-Karatasi incident in 1980, and also the one of Wagalla, the Special
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Branch was a very powerful organ in the Government of Kenya? Do you agree with me?
It was powerful in the sense that whatever you said was taken very seriously and you had
a lot of influence in decision-making within the Government even though silently. You
agree with me on that?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Good! It was not like the NSIS now who
just make reports to the President but yours was a police sort of action. You had the
power to arrest and detain. You had a lot of powers. A while ago when my fellow
Commissioner was asking you about the communal punishment, let us be very honest on
this one. Communal punishment in the way of animal rustling was not a phenomenon that
was normal and usual in North Eastern Province like in Pokot and Turkana areas. What
you were dealing with was banditry. Is that correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Occasionally, of course, some animals
would be taken in the form of banditry attack. So the communal punishment you are
talking about was already a tradition that was normal with the people there, that if I am
clan A and I kill somebody from clan B, I would pay 100 camels. In fact, up to today, we
do not have a judge in North Eastern Province because the laws that operate there are so
traditional that you do not even require a judge, up to and including death. Is that
correct? There was the blood money. So this communal punishment was something else
other than animal taking, if you can agree with me.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Agree with me just for the record of the
HANSARD. Now, communal punishment would mean to collect people from their
homes and gather them in some open area for some days without food and water. That is
the communal punishment you talked about in your report. Is it not?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I am not the one.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): I am not putting words into your mouth
but, please, be co-operative. What did you mean by communal punishment? We have
ruled out the animal one now because if you go to one of the chiefs of that clan, if
between them so-and-so was killed, 100 camels were collected, paid and that is finished.
So why would you punish a community? What did they do?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I do not want to be misunderstood. At no level, did we say that
communal punishment is rounding up people and putting them whatever it is. What my
understanding was, was that whenever a crime was committed and you could not get the
perpetrator, then the clan concerned would be questioned.
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The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): How do you question a whole clan?
Mr. Paul Murimi: It will depend on the area. In this particular case, Wagalla and
Degodias were there and they were fighting over many things. Like I was told, they could
sometimes fight over water; they would sometimes steal animals from one another. They
could even kill one another. In the question of killing, if you were a Degodia and you
killed an Ajuran in revenge, an Ajuran does not revenge with the person who killed his
people. He will revenge with any Degodia miles away and vice versa. Those were the
norms of the time.
This depends on which area was concerned with the incident. To minimize this, the
people in that area would be questioned.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): You agree with me that North Eastern
Province, unlike the rest of Kenya, has vast distances in between settled locations?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): So communal punishment after one clan
kills from the other clan, you collect all the other clans in that particular area? Is it not?
Why was that not done in Bute where the deaths occurred and assembling of people was
just limited to Bute? Why did you have to collect all the Degodia people from Habaswein
all the way and bring them in Wagalla Airstrip which is hundreds and hundreds of miles
away? About 20 lorries of army were used. That was a big disservice.
Mr. Paul Murimi: This was not done because of the KIC visit at that particular place.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): As an intelligence officer, please, the DSC
itself had a junior person to you, who was called a District Special Branch Officer. Is that
correct?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): So, why did he not advise them not to do
that and instead collect the men within Bute Town alone and ask them to surrender their
guns?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I cannot answer for him.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): But you know it was wrong?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I cannot answer for him.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): But you know it was wrong?
Mr. Paul Murimi: If it were me, perhaps, I would not have done that.
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The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Good. For the sake of the HANSARD, I
wanted you to state that, that was wrong. If the communal punishment you talked about
was actually provided for in the statute as you said, I have read here Cap.56 of the Laws
of Kenya - Preservation of Public Security Act. At nowhere in that chapter from point A
up to the last where it says a community can be collected from very far afield and brought
to one place. It just talks about restriction of people’s movement. Maybe if you did not
want anybody to come out of Wajir Town, you create a roadblock outside Wajir on the
road to Isiolo and another one on the road to Mandera, and another one on the road to
Moyale. That way, you preserve but never collect people and gather them in one place.
This happened not in Wagalla alone. Earlier on in 1980, it happened in Garissa and in
1989, it happened in Garimagalla.
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Do you agree with me that for the sake of
our records that this was nothing in the statutes of Kenya, it was just regulations which
were made by powerful administrators to punish people, if I may put it that way?
Mr. Paul Murimi: You may be right that the thing might have been overdone and that it
was out of place to collect people from all those areas. I agree with you in that sense.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Absolutely!
Mr. Paul Murimi: I also agree that it is not always necessary to go to that extent. But my
point is that that operation, whenever it took place, the people who can be held
accountable are the ones who were there at that time.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Let us leave Wagalla and come to Garissa.
Although you were not here, Mr. Kaaria told us that when four people were killed in a
bar, the DSC, with an intelligence officer, met and thought that these must be bandits
from Somalia who had come to attack Garissa. Because you have been involved in
intelligence gathering for a long time, would it not have been better to look for the
intelligence before acting? In other words, was it not wrong to collect all the people of
Garissa and assemble them in an open primary school ground in order to ask them to tell
you where the bandits were? When I say intelligence people like you, it means you had
some friends within the community from whom you were gathering information from.
Correct? Do you agree with me?
Mr. Paul Murimi: Yes.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Would it not have been better to do it that
way rather than collect people and assemble them in an open ground?
Mr. Paul Murimi: According to our training, we are not supposed to go to that extent.
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The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Yes.
Mr. Paul Murimi: According to our training we are not supposed to go to that extent. In
fact, we are not even supposed to be in the operation--The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): When collecting information from a large
group, you are supposed to infiltrate the people and gather information slowly and find
out where these bandits were from and where they were going. After all, the public was
assisting.
However, you agree with me that by collecting the people together in Garissa open
primary school, you were making them not to give you information by punishing them.
Rather, if you would have done it silently you would have got more information. Is that
correct or not?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I think that was wrong. I said from training they are not supposed to
do that.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Thank you very much. You have been very
helpful.
Tell me; the North Eastern Province Security Scheme; was it not the Special Branch who
offered it and gave it to Kaaria?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I am not sure.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): You are not sure but you have heard about
that scheme?
Mr. Paul Murimi: I have not even seen it. I never saw it.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): It has Special Branch codes in it.
Mr. Paul Murimi: I have not seen it.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): But you worked at the headquarters as well
as at the provinces.
Mr. Paul Murimi: I am saying I am not aware because I worked there and I never saw it
there.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): So, it is a foreign document to you?
Mr. Paul Murimi: To me, it is foreign.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): And it has no legal basis?
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Mr. Paul Murimi: I am not aware of that.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Thank you very much. I have no further
questions for you. Thank you for cooperating with us. Again, I join all the
Commissioners in commending you for having volunteered to come forward and give us
information. This is the spirit of our investigations. This is the spirit of our truth telling
and this is the spirit of the TJRC Act.
We have to investigate our part. We have to record all our historical injustices. We have
to find out the reasons why these injustices occurred. We have to make
recommendations, reparations and amnesty. You have been of great help and I thank you
very much.
Leader of Evidence, unless you have another witness, which I doubt, it is 2.00 p.m. I
think we should go for lunch. There are no hearings tomorrow so tell us the programme
ahead.
Mr. Tom Chavangi: Commissioners, we have consulted and the investigation team has
identified a very crucial witness in the name of Lt. Col. Muhindi. We suggested that we
hear that witness on the 23rd of this month at this venue from 9.00 a.m. It will be a
Thursday.
We also suggest, with your wisdom, that Mr. ole Serien who is the PC for the North
Eastern Province at the moment, be contacted for the purposes of giving a statement
because he is a witness who is not at the moment relevant in this particular session. He
can give a statement in regard to what the Commission feels is relevant. Then there is one
witness for Wajir called Mr. Bishar. I have just contacted him and I have told him that we
shall hear him during the massacre hearings or the massacre week within our calendar.
Thank you.
The Presiding Chair (Commissioner Farah): Thank you very much.
Master of Ceremony, take over and lead us in prayers.
(Closing prayers)
(The Commission adjourned at 2.05 p.m.)
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